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 Introduction
Multicriteria optimization extends optimization theory by permitting several  possibly
conicting  objective functions which are to be optimized simultaneously By now
an important branch of Operations Research see Steuer et al 		
 it ranges from
highly verbal approaches like Larichev and Moshkovich 		 to highly mathematical
approaches like Sawaragi et al 	 and is known by various other names includ
ing Pareto optimization vector optimization ecient optimization and multiobjective
optimization Formally a multicriteria optimization problem can be formulated as
Optimize f

x     f
n
x
subject to x  F

where F denotes the feasible set of alternatives and n  N the number of separate objective
functions f
k
 F  R k       n
The simultaneous optimization of multiple objective functions suggests the question
what does it mean to optimize ie what is a good outcome Dierent answers to this
question lead to dierent ways of solving multicriteria optimization problems For a
detailed description and good introductions to the area see White 	 Yu 	 and
Zeleny 	
Yu 	 introduced compromise solutions based on the idea of nding a feasible
point that is as close as possible to an ideal outcome Zeleny 	
 even states this
informally as an axiom of choice
Alternatives that are closer to the ideal are preferred to those that are farther
away To be as close as possible to the perceived ideal is the rationale of human
choice
The ideal point or utopia point species for each objective function separately the op
timal feasible value Assume for instance that in the optimization problem  higher
values of the objective functions correspond with better outcomes In that case the utopia
point u  R
n
is dened by taking
k  f     ng  u
k
 max
xF
f
k
x

Whereas Yu 	 concentrates on distance functions dened by 
p
norms possible ex
tensions include the use of dierent norms cf Gearhart 		 or penalty functions cf
White 	
In a manifesto Bouyssou et al 		 observe that within multicriteria decision mak
ing a systematic axiomatic analysis of decision procedures and algorithms is yet to be
carried out Yu 	 	 and Freimer and Yu 	
 already indicate several proper
ties of compromise solutions In this paper we concentrate on the Euclidean compromise
solution selecting the feasible point that minimizes the Euclidean distance to the utopia
point and provide a list of properties characterizing this solution the Euclidean compro
mise solution is shown to be the unique solution concept satisfying these properties on a
domain of multicriteria optimization problems
Most of the axioms can be found in Yu 	 	 and Freimer and Yu 	
 Two
new axioms are introduced a projection property and a scaling property The projection
axiom indicates that if all likely solution candidates ie all Pareto optimal points have
the same value according to a certain criterion then attention can be restricted to the
remaining coordinates The scaling axiom tells how the solution reacts to rescaling the
coordinates of certain symmetric choice sets by a positive constant
The setup of the paper is as follows Section  contains preliminary results and deni
tions The Euclidean compromise solution and the domain of choice problems are dened
in Section  In Section  the axioms are stated and it is shown that the Euclidean com
promise solution indeed satises these properties Our main result Theorem  is given
in Section  where the Euclidean compromise solution is shown to be the unique solution
concept satisfying these properties Section 
 contains remarks on possible modications
of our characterization and related literature
 Preliminaries
Let n  N For vectors a b  R
n
 write
a  b  k  f     ng  a
k
 b
k
a  b  k  f     ng  a
k
 b
k
a  b  a  b and a  b

a  b  k  f     ng  a
k
 b
k
Relations   are dened analogously Denote R
n

 fx  R
n
j x  g and R
n


fx  R
n
j x  g For two sets AB  R
n
 dene A  B  fa b j a  A b  Bg Let
a  R
n
 With a slight abuse of notation we sometimes write aB instead of fagB
Let n  N and S  R
n
 A point x  S is Pareto optimal in S if there is no feasible
alternative y  S such that y  x The set of Pareto optimal points of S is denoted by
POS
n  NS  R
n
 POS  fx  S j 	y  S  y  xg
Lemma  Let n  N and S  R
n
be nonempty compact For each x  S there exists
a vector y  POS such that y  x
Proof Consider T  fxgR
n

 
 S Let y  arg max
zT
P
n
i
z
i
 which exists by com
pactness of T and continuity of the function z 
P
n
i
z
i
 Then y  POS and y  x by
denition of T  
The inner product is denoted by h  i
n  Nx y  R
n
 hx yi 
n
X
i
x
i
y
i

The Euclidean norm is denoted by k  k
n  Nx  R
n
 kxk 
q
hx xi
The ball centered at x  R
n
with radius r   is denoted Bx r
Bx r  fy  R
n
 ky  xk  rg
Remark  Let y  Bx r with ky  xk  r We often use the fact that
fz  R
n
 hy  x zi  hy  x yig
is the unique hyperplane supporting the ball Bx r at the point y 

Let n  N n   and consider a coordinate i  f     ng The function that projects
each x  R
n
to the point in R
n
obtained by omitting the ith coordinate is denoted by
p
i
 Formally
x  x

     x
i
 x
i
 x
i
     x
n
  R
n
 p
i
x  x

     x
i
 x
i
     x
n

We say that p
i
x  R
n
is the vector obtained from x  R
n
by projecting away the ith
coordinate If S  R
n
 then p
i
S  fp
i
s j s  Sg
For x y  R
n
 dene x  y  x

y

     x
n
y
n
 the vector obtained by coordinatewise
multiplication For a set S  R
n
 x  S  fx  s j s  Sg For x  R
n

 dene
x

 

x

    

x
n
 the vector obtained by taking coordinatewise reciprocals
For a normal h  R
n
and a number a  R
n
 the hyperplane Hh a and corresponding
halfspace H

h a are dened as follows
Hh a  fx  R
n
j hh xi  ag
H

h a  fx  R
n
j hh xi  ag
Lemma  Let n  N h b  R
n

 a  R Then b H

h a  H

h  b

 a
Proof Let y  b H

h a Then y  b  x for some x  H

h a so hh  b

 yi 
P
n
i
h
i
b
i
b
i
x
i

P
n
i
h
i
x
i
 hh xi  a so y  H

h  b

 a
Conversely let y  H

h  b

 a Take x  b

 y  R
n
 Then hh xi 
P
n
i
h
i
y
i
b
i

hh  b

 yi  a so x  H

h a and y  b  x  b H

h a 
 The Euclidean compromise solution
The Euclidean compromise solution assigns to a feasible set the alternative with minimal
Euclidean distance to the utopia point Each feasible set is assumed to be a nonempty
compact and convex subset of a nite dimensional Euclidean space endowed with the
standard topology Let n  N denote the number of criteria or coordinates and dene

n
 fS  R
n
j S is nonempty convex compactg
the collection of choice sets in R
n
 As usual for a choice set S  
n
and a feasible
alternative x  S the coordinate x
k
k       n indicates how alternative x is evaluated

according to the kth criterion It is assumed throughout that larger values are preferred
to smaller values The collection of all choice sets is denoted 
  

n

n

Let n  N S  
n
 The utopia point uS of S is the point in R
n
that species for each
criterion separately the highest achievable value
uS  max
sS
s

    max
sS
s
n

By compactness of S the utopia point is welldened In the proof of Theorem  we
also use the disagreement point dS dened as
dS  min
sS
s

    min
sS
s
n

A solution concept on  is a function  on  that assigns to each choice set S   a
feasible point S  S The Euclidean compromise solution is the solution concept Y
that assigns to each S   the feasible point closest to the utopia point uS
S    Y S  arg min
xS
kuS xk
Since S is nonempty compact and convex and the function k  k is strictly convex the
function Y is welldened
The choice sets with utopia point equal to the zero vector deserve special mention
n  N  
n

 fS  
n
j uS  g


 

n

n


The following lemma indicates that  is closed under rescaling of its coordinates and
projections and also that utopia vectors and Pareto optima are in a sense robust against
projections The proofs are trivial exercises we suce with proving one of them
Lemma  Let n  N n   S  
n
 i  f     ng and x  R
n

 The following
claims hold
a p
i
S  
n



b If POS  fx  R
n
j x
i
 g then p
i
POS  POp
i
S
c p
i
uS  up
i
S
d x  S  
n

Proof We only prove b Assume that POS  fx  R
n
j x
i
 g
Let v  p
i
POS Then there exists a
e
v  POS such that p
i

e
v  v Suppose
v  POp
i
S Then w  v for some w  p
i
S Let
e
w  S be such that p
i

e
w  w
By Lemma  there exists a
e
x  POS such that
e
x 
e
w Then
e
v
e
x  POS implies
e
v
i

e
x
i
  and p
i

e
x  p
i

e
w  w  v  p
i

e
v so
e
x 
e
v contradicting
e
v  POS
Hence v  POp
i
S Conclude that p
i
POS  POp
i
S
Let v  POp
i
S Then there exists a
e
v  S such that p
i

e
v  v By Lemma 
there exists a
e
w  POS such that
e
w 
e
v Then p
i

e
w  p
i

e
v  v  POp
i
S so
the weak inequality must be an equality v  p
i
POS Conclude that p
i
POS 
POp
i
S 
Let n  N S  
n
 The choice set S is closed with respect to cyclical rotation cf Yu
	 p 	 if for each x  S and each permutation 	  f     ng  f     ng 
x

     x
n
  S ie if S is symmetric with respect to the line ft     t  R
n
j t 
Rg
 Properties of the Euclidean compromise solution
In this section we list six properties of solution concepts explain them and indicate that
the Euclidean compromise solution satises each of them Let  be a solution concept on
 Consider the following axioms
Pareto Optimality PO n  NS  
n
 S  POS
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives IIA n  NS T  
n
 if uS 
uT  S  T and T   S then S  T 
Symmetry SYM n  NS  
n
 if S is closed wrt cyclical rotation then 
i
S 

j
S for all i j  f     ng

Translation Invariance TI n  NS  
n
x  R
n
 x S  x S
Projection PR n  N n  S  
n

 if there exists an i  f     ng such that x
i

y
i
for all x y  POS then p
i
S  p
i
S
Scaling SC Let n  N n   t  R

 and a  R be such that the set
B  fx  R
n
j i  f     ng  x
i
 t  and
n
X
i
x
i
 ag
has utopia point uB    B Let s  R
n

 Then
i j  f     ng 

i
s B

j
s B

s
j

i
B
s
i

j
B

Pareto optimality requires that  selects a Pareto optimal alternative in each choice set
Independence of irrelevant alternatives states that if the utopia point remains unaected
and one only discards irrelevant alternatives alternatives x  T with x  T  then the
solution does not change If  satises symmetry then it assigns equal value to each of
the coordinates of a symmetric choice set Translation invariance indicates that the only
eect of translating a choice set is that the solution is translated to the same extent
The projection axiom indicates that if all likely solution candidates ie all Pareto
optimal points of a choice set S  
n

n   have the same value according to a
certain criterion then attention can be restricted to the remaining coordinates Part
a of Lemma  indicates that the projected problem is indeed a choice problem Let
n  N n   S  
n

 and i  f     ng such that x
i
 y
i
for all x y  POS Let
v  S be such that v
i
 u
i
S Since S  
n

 u
i
S   By Lemma  v  w for some
w  POS Then   v
i
 w
i
 u
i
S   so w
i
  By assumption x
i
 w
i
  for
all x  POS So the projection axiom can be equivalently stated as follows
Projection PR n  N n  S  
n

 if POS  fx  R
n
j x
i
 g for some i 
f     ng then p
i
S  p
i
S
As opposed to independence of irrelevant alternatives this axiom is a way to require
independence of irrelevant criteria Just like the previous axioms this axiom is satised
by many compromise solutions

The nal property the scaling axiom is what makes the Euclidean compromise so
lution stand out from other compromise solutions It tells how the solution reacts to
rescaling the coordinates of a highly symmetric choice set If each coordinate i of such a
choice set B is rescaled by a positive factor s
i
 then the ratio 
i
s B
j
s  B in the
new choice set s B diers from the ratio 
i
B
j
B in the original choice set B by a
factor s
j
s
i
for each pair of coordinates i j In the game theoretic literature on bargain
ing cf Nash 	 Roth 	 such proportionality properties in combination with
translation invariance are common axioms to describe the eect of ane transformations
on solutions to bargaining problems
The following theorem indicates that the Euclidean compromise solution satises the
six properties
Theorem  The Euclidean compromise solution Y satises PO IIA SYM TI PR
and SC
Proof Yu 	 pp 			 indicates that the Euclidean compromise solution satises
PO IIA and SYM It is easy to see that it also satises TI
To see that Y satises PR let n  N n   S  
n

and assume that for i  f     ng 
POS  fx  R
n
j x
i
 g According to Lemma  we have that p
i
S  
n

and
p
i
POS  POp
i
S That p
i
Y S  Y p
i
S follows from the following chain of
equivalent statements
Y S solves min
xS
kxk  Y S solves min
xPOS
kxk
 Y
i
S   and p
i
Y S solves min
xPOp
i
S
kxk
 Y
i
S   and p
i
Y S solves min
xp
i
S
kxk
 Y
i
S   and p
i
Y S  Y p
i
S
The rst and third equivalence follow from PO of Y  the second from the assumption that
x
i
  for all x  POS and the fourth by denition of Y p
i
S
To see that Y satises SC let n  N n   t  R

 and a  R be such that the set
B  fx  R
n
j i  f     ng  x
i
 t  and
n
X
i
x
i
 ag
	
has utopia point uB    B Clearly a   SYM and PO of Y on B imply that
Y B 
a
n
        
Let s  R
n

and A  s B Notice that uA  s  uB   A By Lemma 
A  fx  R
n
j i  f     ng  x
i
 ts
i
  and
n
X
i
x
i
s
i
 ag
By denition of Y A the ball BuA kY Ak around the origin uA   with radius
kY Ak and the choice set A have only the point Y A in common By the separating
hyperplane theorem there exists a hyperplane separating the ball and A supporting the
ball at Y A By Remark  this hyperplane is unique Since POA  fx  R
n
j
i  f     ng  x
i
 ts
i
  and
P
n
i
x
i
s
i
 ag its normal is a multiple of the vector
s

 

s

    

s
n
  R
n

 This means that Y A  
s

for some 
  R and that Y A
satises
P
n
i
Y
i
A
s
i
 a Solving this yields 
 
a
ks

k

and
i  f     ng  Y
i
A 
a
ks

k

s
i

Combining this with  yields
i j  f     ng 
Y
i
A
Y
j
A

s
j
s
i

s
j
Y
i
B
s
i
Y
j
B

This proves that Y satises SC 
 Axiomatization of the Euclidean compromise solu
tion
In this section the Euclidean compromise solution is shown to be the unique solution
concept on  satisfying PO IIA SYM TI PR and SC The proof is split up into several
cases Every solution concept that satises PO must select the utopia outcome if this is
feasible This applies in particular to all onedimensional choice problems S  


Proposition 	 Let  be a solution concept on  that satises PO Let S   be such
that uS  S Then S  uS

Proof Since uS  x for each x  S uS  S implies POS  fuSg By PO
S  uS 
In choice problems with utopia point zero and a Euclidean compromise solution which is
smaller in each coordinate than the utopia point every solution concept satisfying PO
IIA SYM and SC coincides with the Euclidean compromise solution
Theorem 	 Let  be a solution concept on  that satises PO IIA SYM and SC
Let n  N n   and S  
n

such that Y S  uS Then S  Y S
Proof Since S  
n

 Y S  uS   By denition of Y S the ball B kY Sk
around the utopia point uS   with radius kY Sk and the choice set S have only the
point Y S in common By the separating hyperplane theorem there exists a hyperplane
that separates the ball B kY Sk and S supporting the ball at Y S By Remark 
this is the hyperplane Hh a with
h  uS Y S  Y S   and a  hY S Y Si  kY Sk

 
The choice set S lies in the halfspace H

h a  fx  R
n
j hh xi  ag Choose t  R

suciently large so that the set
A  fx  R
n
j i  f     ng  x
i
 
t
h
i
  and hh xi  ag
satises
S  A and uS  uA  
Such a number t  R

exists since S  H

h a h   and S is bounded By Lemma

B  h A  fx  R
n
j i  f     ng  x
i
 t  and
n
X
i
x
i
 ag
Notice that uB  h  uS  h      B since a   Since Y and  satisfy SYM
and PO it follows that
B  Y B 
a
n
      
Since A  h

B and h

   and SC of Y and  imply
i j  f     ng 

i
A

j
A

Y
i
A
Y
j
A

h
i
an
h
j
an

h
i
h
j


So A  
h and Y A  h for some 
   R PO of Y and  implies that hh Ai 
hh Y Ai  a ie hY S
Y Si  hY SY Si  kY Sk

 So 
    
and A  Y A  Y S
Since S  AuS  uA   and A  Y S  S it follows from IIA of  that
S  A  Y S 
The third result of this section considers choice sets in 

for which the Euclidean compro
mise solution has some but not all coordinates equal to the corresponding coordinates
of the utopia point On such choice sets solution concepts satisfying PO SYM IIA PR
and SC coincide with the Euclidean compromise solution
Theorem 	 Let  be a solution concept on  that satises PO IIA SYM SC and
PR Let n  N n   and S  
n

such that Y S  uS but not Y S  uS Then
S  Y S
Proof As before the unique tangent hyperplane Hh a separating the sets S and
B kY Sk has normal h  Y S and a  kY Sk

 Recall that dS is the dis
agreement point of S Take
T  fx  R
n
j hh xi  a and dS  x  g  
n

Then
S  T uS  uT    and Y S  Y T  
The equality Y S  Y T  follows from the fact that by construction the ballB kY Sk
and T have exactly the point Y S in common It suces to prove that
T   Y T  
since   and IIA of  then imply S  T   Y S which was to be shown By
assumption the set
I  fi  f     ng j Y
i
S  u
i
Sg
 fi  f     ng j Y
i
T   u
i
T g
 fi  f     ng j h
i
 g

is nonempty We claim that
i  I  POT   fx  R
n
j x
i
 g 

To see this let i  I and x  POT  By denition x
i
 u
i
T    Suppose that
x
i
  Take y  x  x
i
e
i
 x where e
i
 R
n
denotes the ith standard basis vector
Then hh yi  hh xi  hh x
i
e
i
i  hh xi  h
i
x
i
 hh xi  a Moreover dS  x  y  
Hence y  T and y  x contradicting x  POT  Conclude that 
 holds By 
 and
PO of  and Y 
i  I  
i
T   Y
i
T    
Lemma  and PR of Y imply that for each i  I
p
i
POT   POp
i
T 
p
i
uT   up
i
T 
p
i
Y T   Y p
i
T 
So even though the set T has jIj coordinates i for which Y
i
T   u
i
T  the choice set
p
i
T  has only jIj   such coordinates Repeated application of projection reduces this
number to zero Write I  fi     img and take with a slight abuse of notation
V  p
im
     p
i
T 
the choice set in 
njIj

obtained from T by projecting away all coordinates in I Then
the set of coordinates j for which Y
j
V   u
j
V  is empty Y V   uV  Theorem 
and PR of  and Y imply
p
im
     p
i
Y T   Y V   V   p
im
     p
i
T  
Equality  indicates that Y
i
T   
i
T  if i  I and equality  indicates that
Y
i
T   
i
T  if i  I which proves  
The results above combine into our main theorem the axiomatization of the Euclidean
compromise solution
Theorem 	 The Euclidean compromise solution Y is the unique solution concept on
 satisfying PO TI SYM SC IIA and PR

Proof Y satises the axioms by Theorem  Let  be a solution concept on  that also
satises them Let S   and let T  uS  S  

 By TI of Y and  it suces to
show that T   Y T  If uT   T  this follows from Proposition  If Y T   uT 
it follows from Theorem  otherwise it follows from Theorem  
 Concluding remarks
Bouyssou et al 		 promote an axiomatic approach to the study of decision proce
dures in multicriteria optimization Theorem  characterizes the Euclidean compromise
solution by means of six properties Five of these properties PO SYM IIA TI and PR
are shared by many compromise solutions The scaling axiom SC is a proportionality
property as encountered in the literature on bargaining and is specic to the Euclidean
compromise solution
In a recent article Rubinstein and Zhou 			 characterize the solution concept that
assigns to each choice set the point closest to an exogenously given and xed reference
point e rather than the utopia point which varies as a function of the choice set Their
axiomatization involves a symmetry condition and independence of irrelevant alternatives
Whereas the symmetry condition in Section  taken from Yu 	 requires symmetry
only in the line through the origin with equal coordinates the symmetry condition of
Rubinstein and Zhou applies to choice sets that are symmetric with respect to any line
through the reference point e
The domain of our solution concepts was taken to be the collection of all nonempty
compact convex subsets of nitedimensional Euclidean spaces The condition that choice
sets are compact was used to guarantee the existence of utopia points The boundedness
condition inherent in compactness can be weakened our axiomatization  with minor
modications in the proofs  also holds on the domain of nonempty convex closed and
upper bounded subsets of nitedimensional Euclidean spaces
There is an interesting duality between the multicriteria literature that suggests a
compromise approach by nding a desirable alternative from a feasible set and the game
theoretic approach to bargaining The compromise approach entails formulating a de
sirable ideal point the utopia point and then working your way down to a feasible

solution as close as possible to the ideal The bargaining approach entails formulating
a typically undesirable disagreement point and then working your way up to a feasible
point dominating the disagreement outcome Mixtures of the two approaches like the
KalaiSmorodinsky 	 solution exists as well Conley McLean and Wilkie 			
give an interesting discussion of this duality between the bargaining and the multicriteria
optimization approach and also provide an axiom that is related to but more involved
than our scaling axiom SC Unfortunately their treatment of the multicriteria approach
contains several imprecisions
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